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FOREWORD
Organised crime groups (OCGs) continue to operate in Ireland 
(IRL) and Northern Ireland (NI); sometimes independently, but 
often cooperatively in order to maximise market control and 
profits.  Regardless of political or religious beliefs, they frequently 
work together and will use the existence of a land border to their 
advantage when possible, for example in respect of smuggling 
offences, or simply ignore it, for example in respect of  
drugs supply.  
As consumer habits change, with increased online purchases, we 
increasingly see similarities in ‘black markets’ being opened up 
and developed, impacting on communities in both jurisdictions.  
The world has become smaller in terms of product availability 
and this is true of both legitimate and illicit products. It remains 
essential for law enforcement to work together and learn 
from each other.  Pooling our resources also allows us to more 
effectively disrupt OCGs operating on both sides of the border. 
Tackling organised crime in partnership has long been recognised 
as a key part of policing in IRL and NI. OCGs are adept at taking 
advantage of any potential opportunities that may arise due 
to differences in law enforcement agencies and legislative 
systems.  It is our job within law enforcement to stay ahead of 
these criminal groups.  We do this through collaborative working; 
including regular contact between agencies, the sharing of 
information, and parallel and joint investigations. Strong working 
relationships exist between the Police Service of Northern Ireland 
(PSNI) and An Garda Síochána (AGS) and we continue to build 
upon this to the detriment of OCGs.  
This report provides an insight into organised criminal activity on 
the island of Ireland. As we enter a period of further uncertainty 
in relation to BREXIT, the ability of law enforcement to work in 
partnership is even more important.  We need to work together 
in order to identify any new threats or opportunities that may 
emerge as a result of a changing political landscape.  Continuing 
to develop cross border cooperation between AGS and the PSNI 
remains a priority for both organisations and we look forward 
to building on our strong working relationship to protect and 
support communities on both sides of the border.
An Garda Síochána Commissioner 
Drew Harris
PSNI Chief Constable
George Hamilton
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•  The Common Travel Area (CTA) in existence 
between IRL and the United Kingdom (UK), provides 
major benefits (economic, cultural and societal) to 
those who live and work in both jurisdictions and 
enables and encourages the free movement of 
goods, money, people and information. It however 
also provides opportunities for exploitation by 
criminals, illegal immigrants and extremists who 
use the border to facilitate and enable criminality. 
•  The existence of a CTA between IRL and the UK 
has provided generational benefits economically, 
politically, and socially to a large number of 
residents in both countries. Unfortunately, the same 
freedoms that have benefited so many individuals 
also offer OCGs new avenues to exploit and profit 
from as well as providing a challenging environment 
for combating illegal immigration and the cross 
border movement of extremists.
Circumvention of the Land Border
•  The border between IRL and NI represents 
approximately 224 miles/360km of open 
demarcation between Lough Foyle and Carlingford 
Lough. Individuals can easily pass across several 
hundred road crossings and a vastly higher number 
of unmarked crossings without having to undergo 
any customs or law enforcement checks. OCGs 
abuse this freedom to enable and enhance their 
criminal activities, hoping to avoid detection and 
disruption operations by both law enforcement 
and agency partners. Criminality facilitated by the 
CTA includes smuggling illicit commodities (drugs, 
fuel, alcohol, tobacco, and firearms), moving stolen 
property, and facilitating immigration crime.
•  Immigration crime is facilitated by both the CTA 
and the ease with which individuals can travel from 
ports of entry in one jurisdiction to ports of entry 
in another. It is often easier to travel via the sea 
border from IRL to Great Britain (GB) via NI than it 
would be to travel via an airport. OCGs have been 
observed transporting individuals within the CTA 
most commonly, but not exclusively, from IRL 
to GB. These individuals then typically set about 
establishing an illegal presence within GB which 
is sometimes further facilitated by OCGs putting 
them at risk of further exploitation.
Future Threats
•  The border between NI and IRL is the only land 
border within the CTA (and will be the only land 
border in the UK with an EU Member State post 
BREXIT) and this border (at this time) is completely 
open. 
•  The UK leaving the European Union has the 
potential to increase cross-border criminality. A 
number of NI based OCGs have the expertise to 
adapt and change, both to avoid detection by law 
enforcement partners and to exploit changes in 
profitability (including potential changes to trade 
agreements, etc.). It is likely that they will attempt 
to profit from any of these changes.
•  It is possible that in the near future there may be 
changes to the overall operation of the CTA. While 
it is not clear what challenges and opportunities 
would arise from such changes, it should be noted 
that the interagency cooperation in the fight 
against criminal abuse of the CTA, in whatever 
form, will continue with the same determination as 
before.
3.0 COMMON TRAVEL AREA
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•  There are significant interactions and relationships 
between OCGs, operating on both sides of the 
border, which work together across a number of 
types of organised crime. Almost half of all OCGs 
investigated by the PSNI are known to have strong 
links and associations with OCGs based in IRL. 
•  Mobile organised crime groups (MOCGs) are an 
all-island issue and continue to have a substantial 
impact on incidents of domestic burglary in NI, as 
well as in all Garda Regions. 
•  A large proportion of these groups originate in the 
greater Dublin area and are based around extended 
family networks. These groups are organised and 
sophisticated in their activities and target homes 
which are vacant, focusing on cash and jewellery 
as well as firearms, designer goods and high-value 
vehicles. The disposal methods for such stolen 
property are also efficient and well organised.  It is 
assessed that stolen jewellery is taken across the 
border to IRL, and then onto GB for disposal through 
a network of jewellers and ‘cash for gold’ operators.
•  The threat, risk and harm posed by such groups is 
increased by their targeting of older people. While 
these groups generally seek to avoid confrontation, 
interaction with injured parties poses an inherent 
risk – see case study 1, opposite.
•  Operating across two jurisdictions increases 
difficulties for police on both sides of the border. 
Offenders are highly forensically aware and, 
therefore, forensic opportunities are very limited. 
They demonstrate keen awareness of police tactics 
and are constantly changing and evolving their 
methods of operation to avoid detection. They also 
demonstrate extreme recklessness on the roads.  
•  The border between both jurisdictions plays a 
significant role in the crimes attributed to these 
groups, with movement back and forth regular 
and uninhibited. It remains to be seen what, if any, 
effect BREXIT will have.
•  The Cross Border Joint Agency Task Force has 
focused resources on tackling MOCGs, through joint 
working and days of action. 
•  The MOCGs pose specific seasonal risks through 
burglaries of Chinese and Indian minorities, 
targeting cash and gold particularly during the 
festivities associated with Chinese New Year and 
Diwali.  This is an issue in both jurisdictions. 
4.0  ORGANISED CRIME 
GROUPS (OCGs)
CASE STUDY 1
January 2018 - the PSNI received a report of a 
burglary in Aughnacloy, Co Tyrone during which 
an 83-year old lady had been seriously injured.  
It transpired that a number of individuals had 
broken into her home and, in fear, she jumped 
out a first floor window. Police were aware that 
a particular vehicle had been involved, which 
had also been linked to a number of other, 
similar, burglaries in the area.  Despite having 
false registration plates fitted, the vehicle 
was identified and recovered by Gardaí near 
Dundalk.  Working with AGS, the investigating 
officers in the PSNI were able to determine that 
the vehicle had been purchased by a number of 
individuals from the Tallaght area of Dublin, who 
are part of large family-oriented group  
of offenders. 
6Cross Border Organised Crime Assessment 2018
5.0  CROSS BORDER  
ORGANISED CRIME
5.1 DRUGS
•  The social and economic cost of drug abuse are 
of foremost concern to communities across the 
island of Ireland. At every level of the drug trade 
there are significant negative effects on public 
health, public safety and economic security. The 
drug market on the island of IRL is truly unified 
with supply sources and OCGs operating on an 
‘all-Island’ basis. This represents challenges for law 
enforcement and its partner agencies which are 
countered through well-established cooperation 
channels between AGS and PSNI and with other 
agencies.
•  While the more traditional drug importation 
routes remain in place on both sides of the 
border, the advent of the ‘dark net’ as well as the 
development of numerous, bespoke, psychoactive 
substances and the abuse of prescription 
medications, has led to significant diversification 
in both drug abuse and OCG activity.  
•  Of the four ‘traditionally known’ illegal drugs 
(cannabis, cocaine, heroin, and MDMA) cannabis 
retains its status as the most widely used / abused 
drug across both jurisdictions. At approximately 
€20/£20 per gram it remains incredibly lucrative 
for OCGs engaging in wholesale importation and 
distribution. The majority of cannabis seized in IRL 
is in the form of shaped blocks of cannabis herb or 
cultivated cannabis plants, but cannabis resin as 
well as other derivatives, such as cannabis oil, are 
present in significant quantities. 
•  The two most common sources of illegal 
cannabis are Irish national OCGs, who dominate 
the important routes, and grow-houses. While 
the cultivation of cannabis in grow-houses has 
been a long established trend among OCGs of 
foreign extraction (for example Vietnamese and 
Polish OCGs) and was greatly exacerbated by the 
increase in vacant housing stock following the 
financial crisis of 2008, Irish national OCGs are also 
heavily active in this area.
•  Developments in other jurisdictions present 
functional and policy challenges in IRL and NI. 
Liberalisation of cannabis in other jurisdictions will 
lead to innovation in the cultivation of cannabis 
plants and manufacture of cannabis products, 
including cannabis-infused food products, 
personal care products, supplements, and new 
consumption technology (for example odourless 
vaporiser pens) in both jurisdictions. These new 
products and industrial methods provide OCGs 
with opportunities to maximise their profits and 
to, potentially, spread their risk across different 
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distribution channels. It is highly likely that much 
of this activity will be facilitated by ‘dark net’ 
marketplaces.
•  The improving economic conditions in IRL over 
recent years has also led to a resurgence in 
demand for so called ‘party’ drugs, i.e. cocaine 
and MDMA (and related drugs). Retailing at 
approximately €70/£60 per gram and in constant 
demand across a wide variety of areas from 
urban centres to rural villages, cocaine is second 
only to cannabis in its attractiveness for OCGs.  It 
is as yet unclear if the consumption of cocaine 
has returned to its 2007 peak and stabilised, but 
anecdotal evidence suggests that such a return is 
likely to occur soon if it has not already happened. 
•  With the significance of new psychoactive 
substances (NPS) having been reduced through 
legislation and law enforcement efforts, cocaine is 
certainly the predominant illegal stimulant in IRL. 
In a similar vein, MDMA and related drugs have 
seen a resurgence in popularity in recent years 
resulting from the economic recovery. These drugs 
share their market segment with other substances 
such as ketamine, designer drugs, and illegally 
obtained prescription drugs.  While these drugs 
are well-suited to modern distribution channels 
such as the ‘dark net’, they often remain as a 
small portion of drugs being imported by OCGs 
which deal primarily in cannabis, cocaine, and 
heroin. OCGs involved in ‘poly drug’ dealing tend 
to be smaller in size than traditional wholesale 
importers and this can make tackling the problem 
at a strategic level much more difficult. 
•  In previous threat assessments, crack cocaine has 
been noted as present in the Irish drug markets for 
over a decade. While previously assessed as being 
principally a drug of misuse by people already 
suffering from heroin addiction, it has become 
a larger problem for law enforcement and local 
communities in recent years. While still not a 
drug of national scale, crack cocaine will require 
increasing attention into the future. Several 
countries have experienced significant issues with 
the societal fallout from crack cocaine addiction 
and it has the capacity to ruin lives in a magnitude 
similar to heroin.
•  Heroin remains a significant societal and law 
enforcement problem in both IRL and NI.  While 
the Greater Dublin area retains its status as the 
most problematic area for heroin, in the past 
few years related issues which have been seen in 
Dublin are now being witnessed in small urban 
centres and even in rural towns and villages. An 
analysis of opium use has seen the prevalence 
outside of Dublin more than double during the 
period 2001-2014 while use inside the capital fell 
slightly (although both rates have been stable for 
the better part of a decade). It can therefore be 
said that the heroin problem in IRL is both stable 
and entrenched. It is estimated that roughly 
71% of opiate users are living in Dublin with the 
remaining 29% spread across the rest of IRL. It 
would appear that the age profile of heroin users 
in IRL is skewing towards older people, with more 
than half of estimated users being over 35 years 
of age, which is almost double the figure from 
2006.  In NI the most problematic area for heroin 
remains Belfast City Centre with a visible presence 
of drug use on the streets on an almost daily basis. 
•  The phenomenon of synthetic opioids has been 
a feature of Irish OCG activity since at least 2016. 
While seizure statistics remain relatively low, it 
should be noted that as little as 0.02 milligrams of 
the synthetic opioid carfentanil can cause a fatal 
overdose. Such dangerous drugs have become 
common in other jurisdictions, leading to epidemic 
levels of opioid abuse with a very high rate of 
overdose. 
  Synthetic opioids are available in bulk from 
countries such as China and can be very difficult to 
detect as they can be manufactured in legitimate 
facilities. Although IRL and NI are not experiencing 
a similar crisis, OCGs are mixing synthetic opioids 
into heroin, as well as cutting synthetic opioids 
with bulking agents and selling the substances 
as heroin. The additional health risks associated 
with these activities are evident. There is also a 
percentage of OCGs which intentionally introduce 
synthetic opioids into the drug supply chain, the 
consequences of which potentially pose a severe 
health risk to users. This is, therefore, a serious 
issue which will require continuing attention and 
constant monitoring, given the ease with which 
accidental, and intentional, death can occur as a 
result of exposure to such substances. 
•  The abuse of illegally obtained prescription 
medication has become an issue of significant 
concern in both jurisdictions in recent years. 
This phenomenon involves both the importation 
and distribution of final-form pharmaceutical 
products and the manufacturing of tablets for 
sale from bulk chemicals. Many heroin users are 
also taking benzodiazepines (e.g. alprazolam) 
and / or, so-called, ‘Z’ drugs (zopiclone, zolpidem). 
These drugs are used either to enhance the 
effect of a drug or to ameliorate negative 
effects. Outside of these uses, the market for 
illicitly sourced pharmaceutical products has 
grown noticeably in recent years. Many people 
are taking these substances in addition to 
[prescribed] medication for pain management 
and medication to enhance cognitive and/or 
physical functions. Another identified trend is the 
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use of drugs such as amphetamines in third-level 
institutions, which are frequently abused for 
a short-term gain, with potentially dangerous 
long-term consequences. These drugs may also 
be abused alongside ‘party’ drugs. The combating 
of the illegal sale of pharmaceutical products is 
becoming increasingly difficult as the involvement 
by legitimate businesses and pharmacies 
supplements both ‘dark net’ and OCG sources. The 
abuse of prescription drugs will become an issue 
of strategic importance in coming years.
CASE STUDY 2
March 2018 - as part of a proactive Cross Border 
Joint Agency Task Force investigation alongside 
AGS and Irish Customs, in respect of an OCG 
involved in the importation, sale and supply of 
large quantities of controlled drugs, the PSNI 
carried out an intervention in Dromore, Co. 
Down. Herbal cannabis, with an estimated value 
of £1.3m, was found in vacuum-packed plastic 
bags in a large fuel tank delivered from Spain.
Five persons were arrested at the scene with 
three further arrests following enquiries.  Three 
were subsequently charged with fraudulently 
importing; being concerned in the supply of; 
being in possession of; and being in possession 
with intent to supply a Class B controlled drug.
CASE STUDY 4
November 2017 - police conducted two searches 
under warrant and found a large quantity 
of herbal cannabis, resin, cocaine and cash 
secreted in adapted ‘hides’ at both properties.  
The controlled drugs have an estimated value of 
£300k. Two arrests were made and the persons 
were subsequently charged with the related 
drug offences.
CASE STUDY 3
October 2017 - police stopped and searched a 
vehicle in Newry. A small quantity of cocaine 
was recovered along with a large quantity of 
cash. During follow up searches, police located 
a further quantity of cash, four packages of 
cocaine and a package of benzocaine. Forensic 
testing established that the cocaine ranged in 
purity from 84% - 92%, with an estimated value 
of £200k. The driver was arrested and charged 
with possessing criminal property; possession 
of a Class A controlled drug; and possession of a 
Class A controlled drug with intent to supply.
CASE STUDY 5
March 2018 - Customs Officers identified 
a consignment of cannabis concealed in a 
palletised tank being imported via Dublin Port 
and for delivery to an address in Lurgan. A Cross 
Border Joint Agency Task Force operation was 
put in place and the shipment was monitored 
from Dublin to Co. Down. The operation resulted 
in the seizure of 66kgs cannabis resin and the 
arrest of five individuals in NI as well as the 
seizure of mobile phones, documents and a 
quantity of cash.
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CROSS BORDER OCGs AND DRUG CRIME
•  The primary cross-border aspects of drug crime 
on the island of IRL are the control and supply 
linkages between OCGs in IRL and those in NI.
•  There is significant collaboration between Irish 
and Northern Irish OCGs, but the strongest 
collaborative links are within foreign national OCGs 
which view the island as a single market.
•  The Dublin to Belfast supply routes remain the 
most important for cross-border organised crime 
and have been greatly facilitated by the ease of 
travel along our connected motorways and public 
transport routes.
•  OCGs in IRL are facilitating access for Northern 
Irish OCGs to drug markets in Spain, the 
Netherlands, and even GB. As a result of this, 
inter-agency cooperation between IRL and NI quite 
often takes on a broader international dimension. 
AGS, PSNI, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, 
and Revenue Commissioners have ongoing 
engagement with international law enforcement 
bodies and several international operations have 
been carried out aimed at cutting off drug supply 
routes into both jurisdictions.
5.2 HUMAN TRAFFICKING
•  The exploitation of human beings poses 
significant societal and law enforcement 
challenges in both jurisdictions. Whether through 
human trafficking or otherwise, these activities 
represent some of the most serious offences 
against a person. OCGs in both jurisdictions are 
actively exploiting human beings for financial gain. 
The true impact of this crime remains difficult to 
quantify though all stakeholders continue to be 
dedicated in bringing those involved to justice, 
through interagency cooperation and joint training 
& development. The role of law enforcement 
agencies in both jurisdictions to identify the 
victims in these particular crime types and to 
dismantle and disrupt the OCGs engaging in 
human exploitation are essential in targeting this 
type of criminality.
•  The exploitation of human beings takes place 
in many formats, including online and can be 
enabled by online marketplaces and content 
delivery systems. The growth of the ‘dark net’ 
has enabled OCGs to profit from exploitation in 
a broader and more secure manner. Combating 
human exploitation therefore requires significant 
investment in ICT resources alongside physical 
enforcement measures. 
•  There are significant cross-border elements to 
all types of human exploitation occurring on the 
island of Ireland. OCGs use the border and differing 
legislative provisions between jurisdictions to 
facilitate human trafficking as well as using the 
CTA to have operating bases on both sides of  
the border.
•  Reports of modern slavery and human trafficking 
offences in NI increased to 31 reports [+47.6%] 
in 2017 / 2018, compared with the previous year, 
with the PSNI referring a total of 36 [17 males and 
19 females] potential victims of human trafficking 
(an increase of 2 from the previous year) to the 
National Referral Mechanism (NRM). The NRM 
is a framework for identifying victims of human 
trafficking or modern slavery and ensuring they 
receive appropriate support. 
•  NRM referrals continue to increase in NI with 321  
to date in 2018/19 (compared to 36 for the whole 
of 2017/18)
•  The most common referred type of exploitation 
in NI during 2017/18 was labour exploitation, 
followed by sexual exploitation.
•  During 2017/18, the PSNI Modern Slavery and 
Human Trafficking (MSHT) Unit conducted 173 
screening assessments (a process to safeguard 
victims through early recognition and subsequent 
intervention). The number of screenings reduced 
from 308 in 2016/17, a reflection of a more 
targeted approach.  
•  In 2018 IRL has seen a larger proportion of 
human trafficking cases involving trafficking for 
the purpose of labour exploitation, which is of 
concern, particularly in certain industries with the 
fishing industry being especially susceptible.
•  There are currently several cross border 
enforcement operations ongoing between AGS 
and PSNI, with both police services targeting OCGs 
involved in organised prostitution, modern slavery, 
and CTA enabled human-trafficking. 
•  AGS and PSNI also engage in joint training, to 
build a common knowledge-base and to put in 
place best practice for anti-human trafficking 
enforcement in both jurisdictions. 
•  As well as consolidated law enforcement 
responses, successfully combating human 
exploitation requires engagement with the wider 
community as well as stakeholders in the non-
governmental sector. Education and creating 
awareness, within the wider community, in 
identifying markers for human trafficking is an 
important aspect in enforcement. 
•  Recent operations in the area of human 
exploitation are targeting both the trafficking 
routes and the operations of OCGs post-trafficking. 
1 As of 03/10/18
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Joint AGS / PSNI / National Crime Agency [NCA] 
operations have identified abuses of the CTA 
designed to traffic victims through IRL and NI and 
onto GB. 
•  There are currently several joint AGS / PSNI 
operations targeting OCGs engaged in sexual 
exploitation on the island of Ireland. OCGs have 
been identified and their activities have been 
subject to disruption with large scale international 
efforts being made to dismantle their human 
trafficking infrastructure.
•  The UK exiting the European Union may also 
affect how MSHT manifests in NI. NI is in the 
unique position of being the only part of the 
UK which has a land border with an EU Member 
State. Regardless of how the border is maintained, 
it is likely that NI could be seen as a possible 
weak point within the UK infrastructure by 
criminal groups that would seek to exploit this by 
trafficking commodities and people across the 
border.
•  Increasing numbers of MSHT investigations will 
require continued multi-department, multi-agency 
and multi-national  cooperation.
5.3  CRIMINAL FINANCES
•  Money-laundering, worth multi-billion Euros / 
Pounds, annually is a global business to which 
the island of Ireland is not immune, with 
commercial and financial industries on both sides 
of the border, having the capacity to carry out 
money laundering. Dublin’s status as a well-
developed financial market creates an inherent 
risk to potential exploitation, with every business 
susceptible to (and sometimes willing participants 
in money laundering).
•  Cross border OCGs are active at every level of 
money-laundering, with the most common form 
utilising cash intensive businesses, such as car 
washes and restaurants, which are also vulnerable 
to human-trafficking, for labour-exploitation 
purposes. These businesses take in moderate 
amounts of cash flow from OCGs and mix it with 
their legitimate takings which are then banked or 
distributed in cash.
•  Money-laundering can often be described as 
turning criminal money into ‘clean’ money but it 
is, more precisely, turning criminal money into a 
legitimate source of value. This means that OCGs 
are adept at using the proceeds of their illegal 
activities to procure precious metals, prepaid debit 
/ gift cards, jewellery, gemstones, cryptocurrencies 
etc. These items are easily converted into cash 
and can add further layers of transactions to 
evade law enforcement. Most of these items will 
hold their value for a long time and may even 
appreciate.
•  Money Service Businesses (MSBs), providing 
either currency exchange or transfer facilities, are 
widely and extensively used by OCGs to move 
and legitimise profits. In many cases, a barrier 
to money-laundering in these businesses is the 
employees, who are processing these payments. 
This process is, naturally, vulnerable to cooperation 
between MSB employees or indeed criminal MSBs 
in general. OCGs can arrive at a business with cash 
and, for a moderate fee, receive ‘clean’ currency or, 
for an associate in another jurisdiction, transact 
a ‘transfer of money’. International experience 
has the proven the existence of illegitimate 
MSBs, within certain communities, which offer 
well-established, but less traceable, international 
financial transfer services. The recovering property 
sector in IRL including resurgence in property 
development, involving many participants in the 
purchase of land, labour, and materials, provides 
an opportunity for money-laundering by OCGs. 
•  There are many methods by which criminals can 
launder money, however, the use of ‘mules’ has 
increased. This involves a person’s bank account 
being used to receive monies which have resulted 
from a criminal act i.e. a fraud perpetrated against 
a victim, and the stolen money is transferred 
into the ‘mule’ account where it is subsequently 
withdrawn and transferred back to the criminals, 
with the account-holder, on most occasions, being 
paid a ‘fee’ for the use of their account. Those 
involved in this type of criminality see it as ‘low 
risk -  low harm’ and an easy way to obtain cash. 
However, being involved as a ‘mule’ account, the 
account-holder is laundering the proceeds of 
crime, which is a serious criminal offence, liable to 
a maximum sentence of 14 years in prison being 
imposed, if convicted. Those involved in this type 
of criminality have also been identified as having 
links to dissident paramilitary groupings in NI. 
•  In 2017, the PSNI’s Economic Crime Unit (ECU) 
established a dedicated team focused on 
restraining and confiscating criminal assets. 
In addition to actively pursuing all available 
opportunities to restrain and confiscate criminal 
assets, the Asset Confiscation and Enforcement 
(ACE) Team actively seeks enforcement of existing 
Confiscation Orders, to further frustrate and 
disrupt criminal activity and prevent criminals 
benefiting from their ill-gotten gains. 
  The ACE Team works closely with a number of 
PSNI teams, including the Organised Crime Unit 
and MSHTU. By providing expert advice, guidance 
and investigative support the ACE Team helps 
these Units maximise opportunities to frustrate 
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and disrupt organised criminality by depriving 
them of funding necessary for their criminal 
enterprises. The ACE Team also regularly works 
with partner agencies with the objective of 
helping them identify, restrain and confiscate 
criminal benefit.
CASE STUDY 6
An investigation is ongoing into an individual 
who is believed to have significant links to both 
domestic and international OCGs for offences 
including fraud, money-laundering and offences 
contrary to the Representation of the People 
Act 1983 and involves officers from: 
•  Police Service of Northern Ireland Economic 
Crime Unit
• Garda National Economic Crime Bureau 
• Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs
• Criminal Assets Bureau
• National Crime Agency 
Law Enforcement in both jurisdictions alongside 
Europol and Eurojust have made substantial 
progress in this investigation, including the 
seizure and restraint of assets. Information 
obtained in this investigation provided links 
to multiple fraudulent applications, using 
assumed or fraudulent identities, to banks and 
other organisations and to the laundering of 
suspected proceeds of crime through bank 
accounts belonging to ‘shell’ companies. The 
investigation remains ongoing.
CASE STUDY 7
An investigation into the use of fraudulently 
obtained bank accounts to launder criminal 
assets was commenced as a high-end 
money-laundering and fraud investigation. 
The investigation relied upon cooperation 
between the PSNI, National Crime Agency, Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, AGS, Criminal 
Assets Bureau (CAB) and the Irish Revenue 
Commissioners and involved numerous cross-
border meetings to progress the investigation. 
This level of inter-agency cooperation allowed 
the investigation to be scaled and targeted 
thereby meeting any challenges arising during 
the investigation, which has now concluded. In 
furtherance of the criminal investigation, the 
subject and a number of associates, who were 
identified during the course of the investigation, 
are currently under consideration for potential 
Civil Recovery intervention under the Proceeds 
of Crime Act 2002.
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5.4 RURAL / AGRICULTURAL CRIME
•  Delineating between rural and urban crime 
has been a significant challenge in cross border 
cooperation in recent years. While the issues 
which disproportionately affect rural communities 
are well-established and understood, they are, 
quite often, a subset of more general crime that 
affects the wider society. It is therefore important 
to understand the scope of the issue and the 
dedicated law enforcement response required 
to address it, especially in the border area where 
unique challenges exist.
•  Cooperation between AGS and PSNI has centred 
on identifying issues, especially criminality and 
those involved in committing crime, which are 
common across both jurisdictions and attempting 
to extract the closest crime types for analysis and 
active operational policing responses, particularly 
in the border region. This criminality routinely 
centres on burglary and theft-related offences, in 
particular the theft of livestock, but also include 
driving offences and crimes against the person 
which impact every community. Often crime 
prevention is hampered by the ease with which 
criminals can cross the border into a different 
jurisdiction.
•  To combat the enabling effect of the border, AGS 
and PSNI have progressed joint actions in the 
areas of operations, intelligence, and analysis. 
This culminated in days of action in May, July, 
and August 2018. A specific operational focus 
was given to the activities of OCGs involved in 
burglary, wherein crossing the border was a key 
part of their MO (along with stealing cars in one 
jurisdiction for use in the commission of their 
crimes in the other).
•  The results of successful cross border operations 
are currently the subject of detailed analysis 
to refine our joint efforts to target OCGs and 
individual criminals operating in the border area. 
While the analytical outcome of this particular 
phase of joint operations targeting OCGs operating 
along the border is outstanding, it is evident that 
the continuing of such cross border cooperation 
activities forms a successful blueprint for future 
joint policing initiatives. 
•  In NI, statistics for agricultural crime remain 
similar to those in GB, although well reduced 
compared to recent years with thefts of farm 
machinery and livestock the two biggest trends.  
The border with IRL is assessed to be a factor, 
with stolen machinery crossing the border as the 
main route out of NI. Again, it is considered that 
legislative implications resulting from BREXIT may 
well impact on the investigation of this type of 
criminality.   
Cross Border OCGs and Rural / Agricultural Crime
•  MOCGs, as referenced above, have been a concern 
on the island of IRL for several years with a 
number of MOCGs operating island-wide at any 
one time. This OCG grouping is also a transient 
threat for GB. These groups specialise in carrying 
out burglaries in rural areas quite often targeting 
isolated and vulnerable individuals. They are also 
heavily involved in plant / agricultural theft and 
burglaries against commercial premises. 
•  The border is a key facilitator of this criminality 
and also allows MOCGs to carry out crime sprees 
in both IRL and NI with an increased frequency. 
These groups base themselves in one jurisdiction 
in order to carry-out thefts and burglary in the 
neighbouring jurisdiction before easily reversing 
the modus operandi.
•  MOCGs often target specific goods over a certain 
period of time. A particular vehicle type or model 
may be solely targeted or jewellery may be 
preferred over other valuables. Such criminality 
can have a traumatic effect on individuals and the 
wider community.
•  AGS continues to run Operation Thor as the 
national anti-crime strategy to provide operational 
and analytical resources to counter the crimes 
most often associated with MOCGs. Operation 
Thor has had significant success in disrupting 
the activities of recidivist burglars and similar 
organised criminals since inception.  AGS has 
deployed a full suite of policing tools including IT 
systems, checkpoints, public confidence patrols, 
and intelligence-led interventions. The success 
of Thor in tackling these crimes has also led to 
the deployment of resources to combat crimes 
against the person and public order issues 
which can often have a similar effect on border 
communities.
•  Limited intelligence also suggests that OCGs are 
willing and capable of using drone technology 
in the planning stage of their criminal activities, 
including transporting illicit cargoes across borders.
•  AGS continues to successfully operate a property-
marking scheme introduced in 2017. To date 
this scheme has led to the restoration of a large 
number of stolen items as well as acted as a 
deterrent for OCGs. The scheme has been adopted 
to such an extent that AGS and PSNI are currently 
exploring ways for the PSNI to adopt a similar 
scheme and for a mirroring of programmes across 
both jurisdictions.
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5.5 IMMIGRATION CRIME
•  Circumvention of immigration legislation creates 
a myriad of dangers for the individual involved 
as well as the jurisdiction they are entering, 
illegally. Aside from the risk of falling victim to 
various forms of exploitation, illegal migrants 
can find themselves unable to receive necessary 
services such as healthcare. In addition, unchecked 
entry of individuals in any jurisdiction can cause 
serious public health and public safety issues. 
Unfortunately, the CTA provides the same benefits 
to persons residing in IRL and NI irrespective of 
their legal status.
•  OCGs have utilised the borders between IRL /
NI /GB to great effect in the facilitation of illegal 
immigration with seaports and airports used to 
transit people between the three jurisdictions. 
•  OCGs facilitating the creation of so-called 
‘Marriages of Convenience’ between EU nationals 
and non-EU nationals have been under detailed 
investigation by law enforcement on the island 
of Ireland for several years. These OCGs often 
provide other services to facilitate this criminality, 
including providing fraudulent documentation 
giving ‘legitimacy’ to the proposed marriage and 
the manufacturing of an electronic ‘relationship 
footprint’ on social media. Quite often citizens 
from less wealthy EU countries are paid to travel 
to IRL or NI in order to marry a non-EU national, 
thereby enabling that person to obtain EU-
immigration status. To date IRL has issued over 
200 Deportation and Removal Orders under one 
strand of the investigation of and enforcement 
in relation to the status on marriages of 
convenience. 
•  Investigation of immigration crime also requires 
a commitment to cooperate with international 
partners worldwide and especially within the 
European Union. AGS and PSNI have taken part 
in joint operational activity and knowledge-
sharing, at the European level, to assist in reducing 
opportunities through illegal immigration routes 
and to prosecute the OCGs which operate them.
•  Liaison between AGS, Irish Naturalisation 
and Immigration Service (INIS), PSNI, and UK 
Immigration Enforcement (ICE) is currently 
focusing on joint operations in the border area 
to disrupt OCGs assisting people in transiting the 
border.
•  The migrant crisis in the Mediterranean has yet 
to have a notable effect on illegal migration flows 
on the island of Ireland, but it is worth noting 
that OCGs have tried to facilitate the travel of 
individuals from that region into/through IRL 
and onto the UK. Mitigation and investigation 
will require significant cooperation and resource 
allocation, in particular in the supports to be 
provided to persons so-trafficked, as these 
individuals originate from conflict-zones. 
•  Enquiries are also ongoing in relation to evidence 
indicating that some South Asian nationals have 
been exchanging cancelled UK driver’s licences for 
valid Irish licences and then applying for PSV (taxi) 
licences in IRL.
•  It is reported that Afghan nationals are being 
smuggled into the UK in trucks via NI, with drivers 
driving into IRL, from NI, without cargo, returning 
into NI carrying illegal migrants. Investigations are 
ongoing to establish how the Afghan nationals are 
getting into IRL in the first place.
•  The UK Immigration Enforcement (ICE) works 
closely with AGS on cross-border investigations 
into organised CTA abuse, including facilitators, 
smugglers and document producers. The Agency 
is continuing to intervene, through its overseas 
networks, to disrupt OCGs operating abroad and 
provides intelligence to the visa-issuing authorities 
to prevent inadmissible passengers from travelling 
CASE STUDY 8
April 2018: As part of a joint investigation 
into criminal activity involving cross-border 
livestock, a multi-agency search was conducted 
in Killanny, Co. Louth. Officials from the 
Department of Agriculture, Food and the 
Marine accompanied by appropriate officers 
from AGS, the Food Safety Authority of Ireland 
and Monaghan and Louth County Councils 
discovered an illegal abattoir which had been 
slaughtering significant quantities of livestock. 
The premises was closed by authorities, as it 
represented a health-risk to consumers across 
the island of Ireland.
CASE STUDY 9
September 2018: Following an aggravated 
burglary in Co. Donegal, members of AGS 
circulated a description of the suspected 
offenders to colleagues in the PSNI who 
subsequently stopped the vehicle used in the 
commission of the offence. The two individuals 
travelling in the vehicle were arrested, charged, 
and sentenced to a custodial sentence in NI, 
while AGS continues to liaise with PSNI in their 
ongoing investigation into the aggravated 
burglary.
14
Cross Border Organised Crime Assessment 2018
to the UK. This process is building on work already 
being conducted with immigration officials in 
IRL, to ensure that individuals who would not 
be admissible to either jurisdiction are unable to 
travel to the CTA.
5.6   FINANCIAL FRAUD –  
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
 EXCISE FRAUD
•  Excise fraud across the NI / IRL border is an area 
of serious concern to Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC) and the Revenue Commissioners 
in terms of lost revenue. The border represents 
a risk specifically in terms of fuel & tobacco 
smuggling and fraud due to the nature of 
Organised Crime Group (OCG) activity and the 
ease with which OCGs can conduct their business, 
in either jurisdiction. 
 TOBACCO 
•  Tobacco fraud typically involves the trade in : 
 a)  Counterfeit tobacco products (both cigarettes 
and hand rolling tobacco - HRT). 
 b)  ‘Illicit White’ cigarettes which are 
manufactured legally overseas often in 
emerging economies where little regulation 
exists, with the intent of being exported 
illegally to other countries via a smuggling 
network. 
 c)  Illegal or smuggled non-duty paid tobacco 
products. 
•  In IRL, tobacco smuggling primarily involves the 
importation of large quantities of “illicit white” 
cigarettes which are manufactured in Eastern 
Europe and Asia. Intelligence indicates there 
has been a move away from large container-
loads of illicit tobacco products and that illicit 
tobacco is now being brought into the country 
in smaller quantities and groupage loads, which 
are more difficult to detect. The threat from 
OCGs smuggling counterfeit cigarettes into IRL 
and the UK remains the highest threat to HMRC 
and the Revenue Commissioners, in terms of 
CASE STUDY 10
June 2018: Following a long running 
investigation into Georgian OCGs facilitating 
illegal immigration and mutual assistance 
between Garda National Immigration Bureau 
(GNIB) and UK authorities, seven persons were 
brought before the Courts for offences related 
to illegal immigration. Joint operational activity 
was also carried out with members of GNIB 
assisting in the search and arrest phase in the 
UK.
CASE STUDY 11
February 2018: A Bangladeshi national who had 
been unsighted for almost six years (having 
failed to appear before the Courts, in 2012, on 
charges relating to organising a ‘sham’ marriage) 
was encountered by the NI team while working, 
illegally, in a restaurant. He had been convicted 
in his absence. He was returned before the 
Courts in 2018, where a four-year sentence was 
imposed - two years in prison and two years on 
licence. He will be deported on completion of his 
sentence.
CASE STUDY 12
February 2018: Following a tip-off from IRL, NI 
immigration officers intercepted a Romanian 
national en route to GB, who was the subject of 
a UK Deportation Order. The man has a criminal 
record for several serious criminal offences, 
including more than a dozen convictions in the 
UK, for offences including child-kidnap, indecent 
behaviours and assaulting a police officer, as well 
as having served a five-year prison sentence in 
Romania for child rape. He was prosecuted in 
the Belfast courts and received a four-month 
jail sentence. He was deported to Romania on 
completion of his sentence. 
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tobacco fraud. The number of illicit production 
facilities reported as producing counterfeit 
cigarettes for the UK market remains at a high 
level. The discovery of a substantial illicit tobacco 
factory in IRL in March 2018 demonstrates 
the capability of OCGs known to be facilitating 
illicit production. This factory was known to be 
exclusively supplying the UK market, with seizures 
of cigarettes in the UK traced to this factory. The 
smuggling of raw tobacco is also an essential 
component element to facilitate the illicit 
production of cigarettes. 
•  The modus operandi for cigarette smuggling 
has changed in recent years. Tobacco products 
continue to be imported into NI via postal services 
and fast parcel post in packages varying from 200 
to 1500 cigarettes and up to 1.5kg of hand rolling 
tobacco. OCGs are commonly using legitimate 
business ‘hubs’ to smuggle smaller volumes of 
tobacco products. While this makes smuggling 
more difficult to detect, HMRC and the Revenue 
Commissioners are adapting their profiling, 
research and analysis methods to effectively 
monitor illegal movements of tobacco and 
cigarettes. Smuggled products originate primarily 
from the near continent; however there have 
been seizures of tobacco products originating 
from Vietnam, UAE, China, Singapore, Ukraine and 
Belarus among others. A recent seizure of 8 million 
‘Richman’ brand ‘illicit whites’ cigarettes at Belfast 
Port, in February 2018, originated in Singapore.
CO. LOUTH - TOBACCO FACTORY
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CASE STUDY 13
February 2018: as the result of an investigation 
led by the Revenue Commissioners, a factory, 
manufacturing cigarettes, was uncovered in 
Co. Louth which contained a full production 
facility for making cigarettes, with 23.5 million 
cigarettes and 71 tonnes of raw tobacco 
(which would manufacture a further 71 million 
cigarettes) found at the site along with tobacco 
precursor materials including cigarette filters, 
cigarette paper, filter paper, packaging and 
other materials essential to the production 
of cigarettes. This find represents one of the 
large illicit production facilities ever detected in 
Europe. Eleven persons, working in the factory, 
were arrested by AGS. In July 2018, one of the 
factory workers received a 12-month prison 
sentence. Another worker pleaded guilty and is 
awaiting sentencing.
FUEL
•  Fraud relating to the smuggling of fuel remains a 
major issue in both IRL and NI. 
  In the UK, HMRC’s comprehensive and dynamic 
anti-fraud strategy has driven down the NI 
illicit diesel market share, from an estimated 
19% in 2005-6 to 6% in 2016-17. An analysis of 
results of Revenue’s National Random Sampling 
Programme, published in 2015, shows that the 
series of revenue compliance initiatives from 
mid-2012 onwards have resulted in significant 
changes in the patterns of marked gas oil (MGO) 
and diesel clearances. Extrapolating trends pre-
2013 against current clearances suggests that 
revenue compliance initiatives may be responsible 
for lowering MGO clearances by around 40 million 
litres in 2014 (product that could otherwise have 
been destined for being laundered) and increases 
of legitimate diesel clearances, between 245 
million to 295 million litres per annum.
•  Clearances of MGO from tax warehouses dropped 
significantly in 2013 (-2.2%) and 2014 (-9.4%) 
and were stable (+0.3%) in 2015 despite the 
strengthening economic recovery which saw auto-
diesel clearances rise in the same year (+9.1%).
•  While partially anecdotal in nature, these 
indicators confirm positive feedback from the 
legitimate fuel trade to Revenue and a marked 
reduction in MGO supply to suspected ‘high-risk’ 
traders. These findings are further supported by 
fewer discoveries of sludge dumps (the waste 
product from laundering) in recent years in the 
State. In the nine-month period April to December 
2014, Louth and Monaghan County Councils 
recovered a combined total of 606 sludge-filled 
intermediate bulk containers. In the corresponding 
period in 2015, this figure dropped to 250, a 59% 
decrease. 
•  Both Governments are committed to tackling all 
forms of fuel fraud and close working partnership 
remains in place between UK and Irish law 
enforcement agencies to target and tackle fuel-
related criminality, utilising a range of measures to 
identify changing risks and emerging trends and 
threats. 
•  The UK and IRL introduced a new fuel marker, 
Accutrace™S10 in 2015, which is resistant to 
traditional laundering methods, making it much 
harder for criminals to launder marked gas oil 
and kerosene obtained from either side of the 
border and sell it at a profit.  There has been a 
downward trend in the number and size of fuel-
laundering plants uncovered, compared to prior 
to the introduction of the new fuel-marker. This 
is consistent with an overall shift away from illicit 
laundering, as OCGs are forced to experiment 
with more sophisticated, and often dangerous, 
methods as they seek to defeat the rebated fuel 
marker. 
•  In recent years a threat posed by ‘designer fuels’ 
has been recognised. These are fuels which have 
had their chemical make-up changed, such as 
by the addition of lubricants and bio-fuel blends 
to diesel. While the high diesel content of the 
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CASE STUDY 14
September 2018: During the month of 
September both AGS and PSNI discovered a 
new form of oil-distillation plant designed to 
launder diesel fuel for onward illicit sale, which 
involves the use of highly dangerous chemicals 
and heavy duty machinery. One plant, located 
in Killcurry Co. Louth, was utilising free-flowing 
water in its operations. The use of sulphuric acid 
and high temperatures can lead to explosions, 
as well as water contamination, causing 
damage to property and endangering the lives 
of those involved, and those nearby. The law 
enforcement agencies, AGS and PSNI, liaise 
with the relevant local authorities, environment 
protection agencies and fire services. 
designer fuels makes it possible for them to be 
used as road fuel, their make-up means that 
they are classified as lubricants under specific 
Customs Tariff (CN) codes. As these tariff codes fall 
outside the scope of intra-EU movement controls 
(EMCS) the fuels may move across EU borders 
without supervision, using only commercial 
documentation. Excise fraudsters take advantage 
of this to import these fuels with the intention 
of putting them to road use, without payment of 
excise duty. The issue of designer fuels is present 
across Europe and both HMRC and the Revenue 
Commissioners have increased their focus on 
tackling this emerging trend.
•  Criminals operating in this sector do not limit 
themselves to one form of illicit activity and the 
enforcement agencies in both jurisdictions remain 
alert to the continued efforts of well-funded 
OCGs to smuggle fuel across the border and to 
find ways to remove government [fuel] markers 
from rebated fuel. Continued multi-agency, 
cross border cooperation is a key element of the 
targeted operational activities in NI and IRL aimed 
at responding quickly and decisively to detect and 
prevent this type of illegal activity. 
ALCOHOL 
•  Alcohol fraud mainly occurs through excise duty 
fraud, the smuggling of alcohol from countries 
with lower alcohol tax rates and production/
distribution of counterfeit spirits. The following 
modus operandi have been used to commit excise 
diversion fraud: 
 a)  ‘Mirror’ Loads – multiple use of ARCs (excise 
movement documents) 
 b)  Fraudulent receipt of consignments; 
 c)  Volume of products in excess of the declared 
amounts; 
 d)  Outward diversion fraud - A consignment 
dispatched under duty suspension by a 
tax warehouse in the State to another tax 
warehouse in another Member State with a 
much lower excise duty rate than IRL.
•  Separately, there are also a number of methods 
adopted to smuggle alcohol, including: 
 a)  Removal from the duty suspended system and 
onward supply; 
 b)  Smuggling of alcohol from countries with 
lower alcohol taxes; 
 c)  Under declaring the quantities of alcohol 
purchased from other Member States; 
 d)  Irish traders selling alcohol, without having the 
required excise licence to be involved in alcohol 
trading and without the payment of excise 
duty.
•  Inward diversion (the abuse of duty suspended 
alcohol movements) continues to offer the 
maximum profit-to-risk ratio for OCGs and 
provides a method to move large volumes and, 
therefore, remains the greatest revenue risk 
within alcohol fraud. OCGs are suspected of 
continuing to abuse duty suspension rules to move 
multiple loads of alcohol under a single electronic 
administrative document. This type of fraud is 
prevalent among Irish OCGs, as indicated by the 
volume of alcohol seized entering both NI and IRL 
through Belfast and Dublin Ports. 
•  The Revenue Commissioner and HMRC have 
recently initiated investigations into alcohol-
diversion fraud and duty-suspended alcohol 
moving between both jurisdictions. 
5.7  FIREARMS
Current Situation
•  The sourcing of firearms is a growing concern and 
threat across the world as a result of improved 
technological advancements.  Access, from almost 
any location, to the internet via various devices, 
together with the ability to remain anonymous, 
as well as the availability of illegal commodities 
on market websites, via encrypted browsers, 
for delivery via legitimate postal methods, is 
not new and has been used by criminal entities 
for years and is almost impossible to detect. 
This method of purchase provides opportunities 
for criminals, terrorists and individuals with an 
inquisitive mind to obtain a wide range of legal 
and illegal commodities. The purchase of firearms 
via this method is a major development as the 
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threat from firearms is not just limited to known 
organised crime and/or terrorist groupings, 
vulnerable persons can be utilised as ‘mules’ for 
the purchase and delivery of illegally imported 
firearms. Similarly, persons who are vulnerable 
to radicalisation via on-line propaganda, or who 
harbour a grievance with another may now 
pose a significant threat to the local community. 
However, intelligence indicates that firearms 
continue to be sourced via ‘traditional’ methods, 
including: 
 a)  Concealed importation:  firearms imported 
from GB into NI and IRL.  
 b)  Burglary and Thefts:  this method continues 
to be used by local criminals and / or OCGs, 
in both jurisdictions, to obtain easy access to 
legally-held firearms. In some instances, these 
firearms are stolen ‘to order’, with the injured 
party targeted in order for a specific firearm 
type to be procured.
 c)  Imported and reactivated: it is reported 
there have been a number of postal intercepts 
in GB of replica and/or ‘deactivated’ firearms. 
While there is limited intelligence/information 
available, the possibility of such firearms being 
re-activated cannot be ruled out.
 d)  Swapped for commodities / services: 
again, from information available, indications 
are that OCGs can, under the ‘umbrella’ of 
the drugs trade, drugs, contraband or other 
criminal acts can be ‘exchanged’ for firearms.
 e)  Purchased online / local market: as outlined 
above, trends indicate an increase in firearms 
being purchased via various online gun/
shopping websites.  
 f)  Store and access across jurisdictions: 
criminal and dissident groups are storing 
firearms in one jurisdiction while using them 
in the commission of crime in the other 
jurisdiction on the island of Ireland, thereby 
avoiding being arrested in possession and/or 
storage of a firearm. 
19
Cross Border Organised Crime Assessment 2018
a)  The availability on the ‘dark web’ and via previously 
utilised sourcing methods is likely to see an 
increase in the number of firearms available for 
use by criminal groupings and, potentially, a wider 
demographic in communities on both sides of the 
border, including the vulnerable and opportunists. 
b)  The increasing availability of technology and data 
online concerning the processing and manufacture 
of firearms and/or component parts could see the 
emergence of ‘homemade’ firearms, with a number 
of interventions of such packages recorded to date.
c)  Increasing radicalisation of people, directly and 
on-line, by local and international terrorist groups 
could also see the possibility of the phenomenon 
known as the ‘lone wolf’ – persons who have not to 
the attention of law enforcement previously.  The 
increased availability and opportunity to purchase 
a firearm online could be opportunistic and, 
potentially, fatal.
d)  The continuity of all forms of organised criminality, 
particularly drug-related, could also increase the 
number of individuals/groupings seeking access 
to firearms.  As market share decreases due to an 
increase in suppliers then control and intimidation 
may be used to regain the lost criminal revenue.  
THE FUTURE
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